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Most traditional deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans in the United States en-
courage older workers to retire. For long-service employees, the ﬁnancial
incentive to retire often begins as young as age ﬁfty-ﬁve. Essentially all
pension plans encourage retirement by age sixty-ﬁve. The ﬁnancial incen-
tivesi np ension plans and their signiﬁcant eﬀects on retirement have been
the subject of an established literature in economics.1 Largely absent from
the literature, however, is any clear analysis of why ﬁrms have designed
pension plans this way. To the extent that ﬁrm motivations are addressed,
ac ommon theoretical assumption is that the incentives are deliberate busi-
ness policy decisions designed to induce retirement among older workers
whoa re paid more than their productive value.2 However, this assumption
is made without any evidence from the companies that have implemented
the plans. It may also be true that ﬁrms are largely unaware of the complex
ﬁnancial incentives in their pension plans, and that they have designed
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1. A good summary of this research is contained in Lumsdaine and Wise (1994).
2. The primary theoretical framework for this assumption derives from the literature on
“implicit contracts.” According to the theory, workers are paid less than their productive
value at younger ages, and more than their productive value at older ages—creating an incen-
tive forw orkers not to change jobs, and to work harder in anticipation of the future reward.
Pensions then serve as a means of inducing retirement (or at least reducing the eﬀective
compensation) among those older workers who would otherwise be paid more than their
productive value. See Lazear (1981).
307their plans for completely diﬀerent reasons. This study sets out to under-
stand better the motivations of ﬁrms in designing pension plans, and why
these motivations have resulted in plans that have the eﬀect ofe ncouraging
early retirement.
The issue has particular importance in the context of current demo-
graphic trends. The average number of years spent in retirement has in-
creased steadily, partly as a result of increasing life expectancy, and partly
as a result of younger retirement ages. Between 1950 and 2000, labor force
participation rates of older men dropped signiﬁcantly—from 46 percent
to 18 percenta mong men aged sixty-ﬁve and older, and from 87 percent
to 68 percenta mong men between ages ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty-four. Among
women, the large increase in labor force participation at younger ages is
absenta to lder ages, suggesting the oﬀsetting decision to retire earlier
among women as well. The ﬁnancial incentives in pension plans are an
important factor aﬀecting trends in retirement behavior, and inducing ear-
lier retirement decisions. To the extent that these early retirement decisions
arem adeb ased on distorted (or unintended) economic incentives, they
may represent losses in both labor productivity and social welfare that will
only grow larger as the population ages.
The study is based on the experience of twenty large U.S. corporations.
The analysis draws in particular on a series of discussions about policy
history and objectives with executives at each company, and a review of
internal business documents relating to the design of the policies. In the
case of someo fthe companies, several days were spent visiting the corpo-
rate headquarters, meeting with corporate personnel (including human re-
source executives, ﬁnancial aﬀairs executives, and employee beneﬁts plan-
ners and administrators), and reading through business documents.
Conﬁdentiality of the companies and the executives participating in this
study was critical in completing this research eﬀectively, so that they would
feel comfortable sharing internal business documents and discussing can-
didly their underlying business motivations.
The analysis identiﬁes a number of objectives and motivations for the
design of business retirement policies, including, in some cases, the desire
foro lder workers to retire. In most cases, however, retirement incentives
were either unintentional or secondary to the policy’s central motivation.
In general, the companies were much more concerned with providing com-
petitive retirement policies (policies similar in structure and in value to
those of their competitors in the labor market), and policies that ade-
quately provided for the well-being of their retirees. The design and ongo-
ing evaluation of the policies were targeted primarily toward monitoring
the retirement policies oﬀered by competitors, and assessing the adequacy
of their own policies in satisfying (but not exceeding) the income replace-
ment needs of their retirees.
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Twenty companies were selected to participate in this study. Although
the twenty companies are not a random sample, they include companies
from a variety of industries: ﬁnancial services (four companies), high-
technology manufacturing (four), other manufacturing (four), communi-
cations (two), retail sales (two), publishing (one), pharmaceuticals (one),
consulting (one), and education (one). Their sizes ranged from 2,500 em-
ployees to over 100,000 employees. Six of the companies employed be-
tween 2,500 and 5,000 workers; six employed between 5,000 and 20,000
workers; four employed between 20,000 and 40,000 workers; and four em-
ployed more than 40,000 workers. Nothing was known about the retire-
ment policies used by these companies before their being selected to par-
ticipate in the study.
Of the twenty companies, thirteen provided the same retirement beneﬁts
to all employees; ﬁve had two categories of employees, each with a diﬀer-
entp ackage of retirement beneﬁts; and two had a large number of diﬀerent
employee groups, each with diﬀerent retirement beneﬁt programs. In both
of the latter cases, however, one retirement beneﬁt package applied to a
majority of the company’s employees. Thus, excluding the smaller beneﬁt
programs at companies with large numbers of diﬀerent programs, twenty-
ﬁve diﬀerent retirement programs are represented in the sample.
All of the twenty-ﬁve employee groups participated in either a deﬁned
contribution (DC) plan or a deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) plan as their primary re-
tirement income program. For twenty of the groups, the primary retire-
ment income plan was a DB plan. For the other ﬁve groups, the primary
retirement plan was a DC plan, although two of those ﬁve implemented
their DC plans to replace older DB plans. Sixteen of the twenty employee
groups with DB plans were also eligible for company contributions to a
supplementary savings plan, usually with employers matching a speciﬁed
percentage of each employee’s contribution. Twenty of the twenty-ﬁve em-
ployee groups received postretirement medical beneﬁts.
While the plans diﬀer in detail, all of the DB plans encouraged retire-
ment at older ages. The pension plan at company no. 20 illustrates the
characteristics and complexity of the arrangements. The plan provided a
“full” pension beneﬁt of 1.5 percent of ﬁnal average salary per year of
service, less a Social Security oﬀseto f1.5 percent of the Primary Insur-
ance Amount per year of service. Employees could be credited with no
more than thirty-ﬁve years of service; the Social Security oﬀset could not
exceed 50 percent of the Primary Insurance Amount; and ﬁnal average
salary was based on the highest ﬁve consecutive years. Employees could
retire with this “full” pension amount at age sixty-ﬁve. With ﬁfteen years
of service, however, employees could retire with full beneﬁts at age sixty-
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beneﬁt rate for early retirement was 2 percent for each year between the
ages of sixtya nd sixty-two, and 4 percent for each year between ages ﬁfty
and sixty. Thus, any employee hired by age thirty-ﬁve could retire with 56
percent of the normal pension formula at age ﬁfty, 60 percent at age ﬁfty-
one, and so on, up to 96 percent at age sixty, 98 percent at age sixty-one,
and 100 percent any time after age sixty-two.
Ther etirement incentives associated with DB plans are best illustrated
by calculating the compensation value of the plan to employees at various
ages.T he compensation value of a plan is the incremental change in the
present value of accrued future pension beneﬁts that results from contin-
ued work. The compensation value of the plan at company no. 20 is illus-
trated in ﬁgure 10.1 for a hypothetical employee, with a standard wage
history, hired at age twenty. The plan provisions cause numerous disconti-
nuities in this compensation proﬁle, represented at points (1) to (7) in
this ﬁgure.
1. At age twenty-ﬁve, after ﬁve years of employment, the employee be-
comes vested in the plan, and is credited with ﬁve years of service. The
value of the pension is small, because of the lower salary early in a career.
2. At age thirty-ﬁve, after ﬁfteen years of employment, the employee
has accrued enough years of service to be eligible for the early retirement
payment options. At this point, the employee can leave the company and
still receive a pension at age ﬁfty (the early retirement age), rather than at
ages ixty-ﬁve (the normal retirement age).
Fig. 10.1 Compensation value of pension plan, employee hired at age twenty
310 Richard Woodbury3. At age ﬁfty, the employee can retire from the company and begin
receiving his or her pension. At this point, continuing to work involves
giving up a year of pension income, which partially oﬀsets the increase in
the future beneﬁt rate that would be paid by continuing to work.
4. At age ﬁfty-three, the maximum Social Security oﬀset has been at-
tained, so that continued work raises the future beneﬁt without raising the
future Social Security oﬀset.
5. At age ﬁfty-ﬁve, the maximum thirty-ﬁve years of service has been
attained, so that continued work no longer increases the years of service
credited toward the future pension.
6. At age sixty, the delayed retirement adjustment changes from 4 per-
cent per yeart o2p e r c e n tp e ry e a r .
7. At age sixty-two, the delayed retirement adjustment is eliminated, as
the employee is now eligible for the full pension. At this point, continued
worki nvolves giving up a year of pension income with no increase in years
of servicec redited and no delayed retirement credit. For this employee,
the value of the pension plan has dropped from about 15 percent of salary
between ages forty-ﬁve and ﬁfty-four to 25 percent after age sixty-two.
This represents a sharp decline in total compensation that induces sub-
stantially more retirement than would occur with an age-neutral pension
plan.
Although the plans diﬀer in their details, each of the deﬁned beneﬁt
plans provided by the employers in this sample had an economic structure
broadly similar to that of the plan at company no. 20. Figure 10.2 illus-
trates the average compensation value of all of the DB pension plans in
this sample. In ﬁgure 10.2, the calculations are based on three hypothetical
employees with standard wage proﬁles, hired at ages twenty, thirty-ﬁve,
and ﬁfty, respectively.
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Fig. 10.2 Average compensation value of all pension plans, employees hired at
ages twenty, thirty-ﬁve, and ﬁftyAs shown, the average compensation value of the plans increases with
age until workers are about ﬁfty-ﬁve (a common age of early retirement
eligibility), and then declines rapidly thereafter. The average compensation
value of the plans becomes negative by age sixty for the very long service
employee, by age sixty-two for the employee hired at age thirty-ﬁve, and
by sixty-ﬁve for the employee hired at age ﬁfty. Thereafter, the pension
plan loses value, and thus represents a work-related cost rather than a
work-related beneﬁt. By age sixty-ﬁve, this cost is usually a signiﬁcant
percentage of one’s salary.
Retirement incentives are also an implicit aspect of the postretirement
medical plans, which were provided by ﬁfteen of the twenty employers in
the sample. These policies generally extended the employee’s preretirement
medical insurance through age sixty-ﬁve, and then provided a Medicare
supplement policy after age sixty-ﬁve. Employees who had completed a
minimum service requirement (usually ten years) were generally eligible to
receive postretirement medical beneﬁts if they remained employed
through the early retirement age.
At companies that provide postretirement medical coverage, there is a
sharp decline in the compensation value of ﬁrm health beneﬁts, much like
the decline in compensation value in pension plans. Firm health insurance
beneﬁts have a positive and increasing compensation value up to the early
retirement age. (Their value increases due to increasing health risks as
individuals age.) At the early retirement age, however, employees immedi-
ately accrue the full value of all future medical beneﬁts. Thereafter, there
is no compensation value in the plan, since medical beneﬁts are provided
regardless of employment status—so the incentive structure of such poli-
cies is to provide a large compensation reward for staying through the early
retirement age, and then no compensation value thereafter. This decline in
compensation value reinforces and increases the magnitudes of the incen-
tive structures of the pension plans at most of the companies in this study.
In summary, the majority of the companies in this sample provided both
DB pension plans and postretirement medical beneﬁts, both of which have
rapidly decreasing compensation values at older ages. It is not uncommon
for the value of these beneﬁts to change over a very short period, from a
supplement of 20 percent or more of salary to a cost of 20 percent or more
of salary. This induces substantially more retirement than would otherwise
take place.
10.3 Retiree Welfare as a Company Objective
In discussing the design of their retirement policies, most of the execu-
tivesp articipating in this study referred to “caring about retirees,” “moral
responsibility for retirees,” “social responsibility for retirees,” “social con-
science,” or some other expression of paternalistic company values. From
312 Richard Woodburythe perspective of many executives, retirement beneﬁts were viewed more
as entitlements for retired employees than as compensation for working
employees. The following comments and excerpts from company reports
arer epresentative of the views expressed by many of the company execu-
tivesi n terviewed about their policies:
We publicize our retirement plans extensively among our employees, so
the cost of the policies has the best chance of paying oﬀ. But even if
they don’t pay oﬀ,a nd they probably don’t, we feel it’s our responsibility
to provide the policies anyway. [Company no. 6] is very paternalistic.
(Interview at company no. 6)
In its role as a major corporation in our industrial society, [company
no. 15] recognizes a responsibility and obligation to its employees to
provide income for those years after an employee ceases active employ-
ment because of retirement. (Report from company no. 15)
[Company no. 18’s] new paternalism means: providing a safety net for
retirees’ needs. (Presentation slide at company no. 18)
Ther etiree beneﬁt programs . . . demonstrate [company no. 20’s] con-
tinuing concern for the well-being of its retirees. (Report from company
no. 20)
Thep r actical application of paternalistic values in the design of pension
plans is most clearly represented in the widespread use of explicit income
replacement targets for retired employees. The idea behind income replace-
ment targets is to identify the percentage of preretirement income that the
company believes will provide an appropriate standard of living in retire-
ment. The speciﬁcity of the income replacement targets varied across com-
panies. Company no. 2 speciﬁed a postretirement income replacement tar-
get (including Social Security) of 55 percent of preretirement income for
employeeswithatleastthirtyyearsofservice.Companyno.4hadanincome
replacement target of 65–70 percent for employees with thirty years
of service. Company no. 16 had an income replacement target of 75 to 80
percent for employees with twenty-ﬁve years of service. Company no. 19
had an income replacement target of 67 percent for employees with thirty-
ﬁve yearso fs ervice. Other income replacement targets, such as those
shown in table 10.1, varied by income, marital status, and service tenure.
While the speciﬁc income replacement targets varied across companies
and across groups of employees within companies, the important point is
that companies adopted income replacement targets at all. Concerns about
retirement standard of living, retiree welfare, and income replacement sug-
gest a very diﬀerent view of retirement beneﬁts than as components of
compensation designed to achieve labor market objectives for working em-
ployees.
Other aspects of company policy further demonstrate concern for retiree
welfare. For example, many companies have implemented ad hoc increases
in the pension payments of retirees to compensate them partially for in-
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increaseshavebeen incurred,eventhoughthecompanieshave hadnolegal
obligation to make them. The reason given for these beneﬁt adjustments
was that high inﬂation rates had placed a particular hardship on retirees,
and that companies were concerned about the welfare of these retirees.
Concern for retiree welfare also motivated many of these ﬁrms to credit
the years of service performed by employees before the implementation or
improvement of a plan. Again, the motivation for this retroactive compen-
sation seems based on a paternalistic concern for retiree welfare. A report
outlining new pension beneﬁts at company no. 15 clearly expresses this
philosophy:
It became obvious that the magnitude of the problem of prior service
and its potential cost required detailed and careful analysis....T h i s
Committee can see no valid reason, except possibly for cost, why the
Philosophy and Objectives set forth should not apply to those persons
whoa re nearing the end of their career as well as those just embarking
on their careers. Thus, the improvement of beneﬁts already accrued
would not only seem a valid objective, but has an immediacy which
dramatizes its importance.
Another policy decision made by most companies has been to provide
(or at least subsidize) medical beneﬁts for the spouses and dependents of
retired (as well as active) employees. Again, these additional expenses were
incurred even though there was no legal obligation to provide them. And
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Table 10.1 Income Replacement Targets
Income ($) Single Married
Company no. 20











Pay Level Full Career Partial Career Short Service
Company no. 18
1977 report Low .74 .67 .56
Medium .61 .51 .39
High .45 .37 .29again, concern (or responsibility) for employee and retiree welfare was the
justiﬁcation made by business executives. According to a report at com-
pany no. 20, “the beneﬁt design reﬂects [company no. 20’s] belief that it is
the company’s responsibility to provide protection for a retiree’s depen-
dents as well as for the retiree.”
10.4 Paternalism and the Design of Retirement Policy
Having identiﬁed retiree welfare as a key motivating objective in the
design of retirement policies, one then asks why the resulting policies have
the eﬀecto fi nducing retirement. This section provides some evidence on
how these motivations were translated into policies with particular charac-
teristics.
The typical business perspective on plan design had the following com-
ponents:
1. Deﬁned beneﬁt plans, by providing an explicitly deﬁned stream of
retirement income, are thought to be more consistent with paternalistic
company values than are DC plans, which have no future income assur-
ances.
2. There is a sense that any employee who has committed a full career
of service, as deﬁned by years of employment, should be entitled to retire
with the support of the company. Thus, a thirty-year employee, for ex-
ample, should be entitled to health insurance and an adequate pension,
whether he or she chooses to retire at age ﬁfty-ﬁve or age seventy-ﬁve.
3. Pension payments should not be larger than what is necessary to
maintain one’s preretirement standard of living.
It turns out that these three motivating considerations have led to policies
with implicit retirement incentives, even though the retirement incentives
were not evenc onsidered when the policies were being implemented.
Among companies with DB plans, executives expressed the value of an
assured level of retirement income that would enable career employees to
retain their preretirement standards of living. The beneﬁt formulas could
be calibrated to any targeted level of income replacement. Formulas inte-
grated with Social Security (like those used by most of the companies in
this study) could be calibrated even more precisely to total income replace-
ment objectives. For this reason, DB plans were often viewed as preferable
to DC plans.
Of course, a company’s choice of a DB plan (rather than a DC plan)
need not imply an economic structure that encourages retirement. One
could actuarially adjust the beneﬁt rate to account for diﬀerent retirement
ages,s othat the ﬁnancial structure would be age neutral. However, this
would lead to very diﬀerent income replacement rates among those retir-
ing at younger ages, as compared with those retiring at older ages. Either
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whom the company wants to support fully in retirement; or the normal
and late retirement beneﬁts would be higher than what is considered an
appropriate retirement pension. The resulting decisions about how to treat
early and late retirees has led to pension plans with implicit retirement
incentives such as those summarized in section 10.2. The following ex-
cerpts from company reports illustrate some of these concerns, including
the decision to limit the years of service credited in many plans:
(a) With regard to age, we saw no rationale for maintaining that a 66
year olde m ployee deserved a higher level of income replacement from
the Company than a 65 year old with the same amount of credited ser-
vice. (b) Speciﬁcally, it was felt that [company no. 15] should not allocate
itsr esources to provide more than 100% replacement of pre-retirement
disposable income.
This issue with regard to length of service greater than the full career
benchmark is more complex inasmuch as one could maintain that em-
ployees with greater longevity are entitled to a greater level of income
replacement solely because of that longevity. The Task Force’s consen-
sus, however, was that the proposed income replacement goals are a
reasonable measurement of [company no. 15’s] share of the total respon-
sibility for providing post retirement income replacement....I ts h o u l d
notb en ecessary to spend money in order to provide levels of income
replacement beyond these goals. For this reason, it was determined that
a maximum limitation on the accumulation of credited service was
needed to prevent the over-provision of beneﬁts to those employees with
servicel onger than the 30-year full career benchmark. (Report from
company no. 15)
Studies show that if the pension beneﬁt plus Social Security beneﬁt
exceedsm ore than 83 to 85 percent of ﬁnal pay—[the] employee will
have more after-tax dollars in retirement than while working....[ W e
arec oncerned] that future improvements in the pension plan will result
in the sum of [company no. 7’s] pension plan plus Social Security pro-
viding more than take home pay in some cases. (Slide at company no. 7)
The same way of thinking applies to postretirement medical beneﬁts.
Once an employee has had a service history long enough to become a
responsibility of the company, then the full postretirement medical beneﬁt
has been provided, whether the individual chooses early, normal, or late
retirement. Again, there is an implicit retirement incentive in this ap-
proach that has nothing to do with the paternalistic intent of the plan de-
sign.
In summary, companies expressed a great deal of concern for the well-
being of their retired employees. This concern motivated the provision of
retirement policies designed to provide an acceptable (but not excessive)
standard of living to all long-service employees during their retirements,
regardless of the age when retirement took place. Policies satisfying these
316 Richard Woodburypaternalistic objectives implicitly contain retirement incentives, even
though the incentives were not at all the primary motivation for the pol-
icy design.
10.5 Policy Competitiveness
Competitiveness was expressed as the other central motivation for the
implementation and design of retirement policies at most companies.
Companies spend considerable resources monitoring the retirement poli-
cies provided by competing employers and comparing those policies with
their own. Beneﬁts consultants assist companies in maintaining current
information about the policies being provided by their competitors, and in
making comparisons among the policies at diﬀerent companies. In some
cases,c ompanies develop very explicit competitiveness targets much like
the income replacement targets described above:
We position pension beneﬁts on the basis of comparative studies with
major industries, and such comparisons are based upon current survey
data. Market relationships based on these studies change over time and
we need the ability to take into account such movements. (Report from
company no. 7)
Speciﬁcally, it is [company no. 9’s] objective to provide retirement
beneﬁts to a typical employee . . . which places us at the 50th percentile
of beneﬁts payable from a large group of 250 U.S. based manufacturing
companies. The income replacement of these beneﬁt levels is higher for
lower paid people than it is for higher paid people. (Report from com-
pany no. 9)
An examination of the table in Appendix A will disclose that there is
room fori mprovementi no ur competitive posture for normal retirement
beneﬁts. At the $70,000 income level, the Salaried Plan ranks 17th out
of 38 companies, or in the lower end of the third quartile. The income
replacement level exactly matches the mean. [Company no. 15] ranks
22nd, or at the bottom of the second quartile at the $30,000 income level
and 35th—well within the lowest quartile—at the $15,000 income level.
(Report from company no. 15)
Desired Competitive Position (quartile ranking relative to competing companies)
Retirement or Termination Age
Years of Service 65 62 55 45 35
35 1st 1st 1st — —
25 1st 1st Median 3rd —
18 Median Median Median 3rd —
10 4th 4th 4th 4th 4th
(Report from company no. 18)
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within the . . . industry. (Report from company no. 20)
Thei m plication of these concerns is that company policies tend to
evolve together. Because each company is continually monitoring the poli-
cies of competitors in the labor market, there is a strong tendency to create
policies with a similar structure and a similar value. Considering this in
historical context, the leading large companies in the United States estab-
lished retirement plans thinking largely about retirement security for their
career-service employees. This approach then became the model from
whicho ther companies needed to compete. Thus, many more companies
subsequently implemented traditional DB pension plans, not because of
their retirement incentive eﬀects, nor because of their concern for retiree
welfare, but because it became the standard for major U.S. employers.
Thed evelopment of retirement plans at companies no. 2 and no. 8 sup-
ports this perspective. Both companies began with no retirement beneﬁts
and with a comparatively young labor force. According to executives at
each company, as workers got older, they became more interested in retire-
ment and, consequently, more interested in retirement beneﬁts. Observing
the retirement beneﬁts provided to employees at other companies, employ-
ees at companies no. 2 and no. 8 began to request similar beneﬁts for
themselves. Responding to these requests, company no. 8 implemented a
DB plan in the mid-1970s, and company no. 2 implemented a similar plan
in thelate 1970s. Theplans were selected becausethey were similarto those
oﬀered by other large employers. Since both companies were expanding
rapidly during this period, inducing retirement was almost certainly not
the motivation for the plan design. According to executives at these com-
panies, there were no speciﬁc objectives in designing their pension plans
other than to satisfy their older workers by oﬀering a standard plan.
In some cases, companies have revised their policies to provide larger
early retirement incentives, not because they have wanted to encourage
earlier retirement, but because they have wanted to remain competitive.
An executive at company no. 19, for example, suggested that his company
wasc onsidering a revision to the pension plan for this exact purpose:
We have a program that asks for employee recommendations about the
business. It’s a program called “[company no. 19] listens.” Lately, we
have had a lot of requests for larger early retirement beneﬁts. Employees
are pointing out other companies that have more generous early retire-
ment beneﬁts, and they think [company no. 19] ought to have those
beneﬁts, too.
In summary, many companies choose their retirement policies to be sim-
ilar in structure and in value to the retirement plans oﬀered by competing
companies. Deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans and postretirement medical
plans have historically been the standard for large employers in the United
318 Richard WoodburyStates. Over time, many companies have implemented similar plans. In
almost every case, the incentive eﬀects of the policies have been irrelevant
to their design.
10.6 The Role of Work and Retirement Incentives
Thei n terviews conducted at each of the twenty companies in this study
generally began with a deliberately broad inquiry about the history of the
plans, the motivations and objectives of the plans, and the reasons for their
particular plan-design decisions. Much later in the interviews, after fully
exploring the issues raised by company executives independently, the topic
of work and retirement incentives was introduced explicitly. Inducing re-
tirement was almost never suggested as a plan motivation during the open-
ended parts of the interviews. Reactions to the idea that the plans might
encourage retirement varied considerably—ﬁrst, in the extent to which the
incentives were even recognized, and second, in the extent to which they
were considered a desirable outcome of the policies. Those most familiar
with the incentive eﬀects of the plans were at companies that had imple-
mented temporary early retirement incentive plans (window plans) as a
means of downsizing their total employment.
Overall, companies expressed varying degrees of recognition and attrib-
uted varying levels of importance to the work and retirement incentives
associated with their policies. In reference to retirement before the normal
retirement age and before Social Security eligibility, it was quite common
for executives to discount the importance of retirement incentives. At com-
pany no.2 ,i tw as suggested that there were no particular retirement incen-
tives in the policies, because “most people can’t aﬀord tor e t ire before they
become eligible for Social Security and Medicare.” At company no. 9, it
was suggested that “retirement incentives and the trend toward earlier re-
tirement are a non-issue here.” An executive at company no. 18 recog-
nized—“mathematically”—that the company’s pension plan made less
than actuariallyfair increases in thepension beneﬁts ofemployees delaying
retirement after the early retirement age; this executive argued that few
employees could aﬀordt or etire before Social Security eligibility, so that
the mathematical calculation was not relevant to retirement behavior at
company no. 18. At company no. 20, a plan report stated that “the beneﬁt
design encourages early retirement” and that “the full availability of medi-
cal beneﬁts in early retirement further encourages early retirement,” yet
an executive at the company discounted the importance of early retirement
because “people can not aﬀord tol ive on their company beneﬁts alone.”
Ac o mment from the top human-resource executive at company no. 9 is
representative of the way most business executives viewed the ﬁnancial
characteristics of their plans. The comment was made after the person
heard an economic explanation of how pension accrual varies with age:
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ﬁfty-ﬁve or age sixty-two. The cost of the pension plan gets averaged
outo ver all employees.W el ooka ti ti nav ery aggregate way....Y o u r
argument might be right, technically, but it’s not how we do it at [com-
pany no. 9].
The tendency to look at the aggregate cost of the retirement plans per
employee (or the cost as a percentage of payroll) was evident at most com-
panies. None of the companies interviewed had calculated the accrual pat-
tern of future retirement beneﬁts (the compensation value of the plans) for
individual employees, as has been done extensively in economics studies.
Thus, the views executives oﬀered about retirement incentives were quite
general, rather than quantitatively speciﬁc.
In reference to retirement incentives after the normal retirement age,
most executives did acknowledge that their policies (along with public re-
tirement policies) probably encouraged retirement, and that this was
probably a desirable outcome. While inducing retirement was not consid-
ered a key motivation for the design of the policies, most executives were
not unsatisﬁed with the overall retirement behavior of their labor forces.
The extentt ow hich retirement at older ages was viewed as desirable
varied across companies and, frequently, across executives within compa-
nies. For example, in a series of interviews at company no. 15, one execu-
tive argued that it is good for workers and good for the company if people
retire between ages ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty, two other executives argued that the
company was essentially indiﬀerent to when workers retire; and a fourth
executive was referenced arguing that it would be best if workers never
retired. While the interviews at most companies elicited less diversity of
opinion, the tone in which opinions were expressed was similar at most
companies. They were oﬀered as just that—opinions. They were neither
company decisions nor company policies, but individual executives think-
ing through the desirability of retirement at older ages, and oﬀering their
personal judgments. Both the diversity of opinion and the tone in which
opinions were oﬀered reinforce the idea that inﬂuencing retirement behav-
ior was notap r i m a ry motivation for the policy design.
Numerous opinions were expressed on the desirability of retirement,
many of which parallel reasoning used in the economics literature. Some
suggested that salary increases over a working career have resulted in older
workers’ being paid more than their productive value. In many cases,
younger workers were thought to be as eﬀective or almost as eﬀective as
older workers, but at a lower cost. Some executives also suggested that the
productivity of labor declines at older ages. Company no. 1 suggested that
older workers do not cope well with change. Company no. 5 suggested that
one major class of its employees needs a great deal of energy to do their
jobs well, and that older employees often lack this energy. Companies no. 6
and no. 7 suggested that many of their employees are engaged in physically
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at company no. 15 suggested that workers become less ﬂexible, less ener-
getic, and less knowledgeable about new skills and techniques as they age.
In addition to these arguments about individual compensation patterns
and productivity patterns, some executives argued that the business envi-
ronment beneﬁts from retirement. According to an executive at company
no. 14, the morale, retention, motivation, and productivity of younger
workers depends on their having opportunities for advancement, and re-
tirements create these opportunities. According to an executive at com-
pany no. 15, the regular turnover of older workers also enables companies
to hire new workers with new skills and new ideas, the steady ﬂow of which
is essential for a productive business environment.
An u m b e ro fe x e cutives also oﬀered some good explanations for why
retirement incentives should be applied through retirement beneﬁts rather
than through wage reductions or layoﬀs. Fore xample, age discrimination
laws prevent the use of layoﬀs, terminations, or wage reductions that dis-
proportionately aﬀecto lder people. By contrast, retirement beneﬁts are
praised as corporate generosity. According to an executive at company no.
6, “Cutting the wages of older people would be bloody....L a y o ﬀsc r e a t e
ill will....G e n e r o u sr e t i r e m e n tb e n e ﬁ t sc r e a t eg o o dwill.”
It is clear that every company has some older employees that they would
prefer to keep employed for many years in the future, and other older
employees that they wish had retired years earlier; but it is essentially im-
possible to apply compensation arrangements selectively to some employ-
ees and not others. Executives at companies no. 1 and no. 16 suggested
the use of retirement policies as a device for screening older workers. Un-
productive employees are then eliminated (retired) permanently, while
productive employees are hired back on an hourly or consulting basis (at
no cost to their ongoing pension beneﬁts). While all employees are eligible
to participate in the hire-back programs at these companies, only the pro-
ductive older workers are encouraged to participate.
These interviews give one the sense that company executives were gener-
ally satisﬁed with a compensation system that leads to retirement at older
ages.T he precise age-speciﬁc incentive structure of the plans was rarely
if ever considered in the design of the plans—but their role in inducing
retirement was not inconsistent with what companies seemed to view as
desirable to business dynamics.
10.7 Retirement Incentives and Downsizing
Thef ew companies that referred to retirement incentives as a relevant
policy motivation tended to have declining or changing employment needs.
After declining sales, changes in production technology, or changes in
product composition, some companies want to reduce the number of ac-
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employees with unneeded skills. Inducing retirement among older workers
has been an important alternative to layoﬀsi nachieving these workforce
management objectives. The reasons suggested for using retirement incen-
tives, rather than layoﬀs, relate to their public acceptance. Early retirement
beneﬁts are viewed as acceptable and even generous, whereas layoﬀsa r e
viewed as unpleasant and insensitive to employees.
Unlike the permanent retirement policies discussed above, window
plans are quite explicitly designed to encourage retirement among older
workers. A report at company no. 15, for example, includes the following
justiﬁcation for a window plan at one of its divisions:
The proposed voluntary early retirement incentive program is part of
a plan developed by [division] to produce a downsized, more eﬃcient
organization. This plan was developed due to a 42% decline in net after-
tax proﬁts from 1983 to the 1985 midyear estimate, a decline which has
been attributed to industry overcapacity and severe price competition.
Because window plans are explicitly designed to induce retirement, ex-
ecutives at companies that have used window plans have gained a great
deal more appreciation for the capacity of retirement policies to inﬂuence
retirement behavior. Thus, when these executives discussed the motiva-
tionsf or their retirement policies—broadly deﬁned—they were more
likely to include retirement incentives as a relevant policy motivation.
What is diﬀerent about these companies is the greater awareness and ap-
preciation of the retirement incentives that already existed in their regular
retirement policies, rather than any diﬀerences in the original motivations
for their policies.
Thee xperiences of companies no. 5 and no. 7 exemplify both the role
of retirement policies in the transition process and the resulting apprecia-
tion forr etirement policy incentives. Both companies experienced major
technological innovations in their production techniques. Because of these
innovations, the skills of most of their workers were no longer necessary
in the production process, and the total number of workers needed was
smaller.
At company no. 5, the decline in employment needs was almost entirely
among the unionized workers. This presented a particular challenge for
management at company no. 5, since the unions placed a high value on
job security. The challenge was compounded because diﬀerent unions had
claims on diﬀerent parts of the production process. If union 1 had a claim
on production process A, then no non–union 1 employees were allowed to
contribute to process A, and no union 1 employees were allowed to do
anything but process A. Because of the priorities and strengths of the
unions, neither layoﬀsn or retraining were as attractive to the company as
retirement incentives. Executives believed that it would be less costly for
the company to fund enormous retirement incentives rather than to ﬁght
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wasa ccomplished through window plans, many of which provided almost
as much money for retiring as for working.
There was a big technological change in the . . . industry, and we had to
negotiate automation with the unions. At the same time, the unions
wanted a lifetime job guarantee. So retirement incentives have been a
very important part of our retirement policies. (Interview at company
no. 5)
Company no. 7 also used a window plan to facilitate its transition to a
lower level of employment. In addition, company no. 7 implemented new
“permanent” pension plans for management and nonmanagement em-
ployees. What is particularly interesting about the experience of company
no. 7 is its explicit reference to retirement incentives in the design of the
new permanent plans. According to an executive at company no. 7, the
new pension plans were deliberately designed to require periodic updates,
partly so that the company could respond to changing business conditions.
Speciﬁcally, beneﬁt values were set at ﬁxed dollar amounts that depreci-
ated in real terms over time. Plan updates could be implemented deliber-
ately at times when management would like more retirement to occur. Part
of the eﬀectiveness of this approach resulted from changes in employee
expectations. Since the updates became a standard and well-understood
provision of the plans, many employees learned to defer retirement until
just after a plan update. This provided an even greater ability for company
no.7t or etain employees by deferring a plan update or to encourage retire-
ment by implementing a plan update.
For somec ompanies, retirement incentives have provided an important
alternative to layoﬀsi nr e d ucing employment and encouraging worker
turnover. Moreover, the increasing use of window plans has increased the
awareness among business executives of the capacity for retirement poli-
cies to inﬂuence retirement behavior.
10.8 Plans without Retirement Incentives
Af ew of the companies participating in this study diverged from the
“standard” approach to retirement policy. Companies no. 1, 3, 10, 11, and
17 had no retirement incentives in their pension plans for at least one
category of employees. Deﬁned contribution pension plans were the pri-
mary retirement policy for these employee groups. Two themes character-
ize the explanations for the plan design at these companies. First, these
companies tended to prefer the immediate distribution of employee bene-
ﬁts, rather than deferred distribution. Second, the employee relations strat-
egy used by these companies was more often oriented toward performance
and productivity monitoring rather than paternalistic support.
Immediate distribution was considered valuable from the perspective of
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ar etirement account that is denominated and maintained for each em-
ployee individually is more tangible during the employee’s working years
than is a future pension entitlement. The employee can see that a particu-
lar asset has been set aside in his or her name and for personal use in retire-
ment. This tangibility creates a greater sense of wealth or value to the em-
ployee than the value conveyed by a deﬁned beneﬁt plan. The popularity of
primary DC plans was emphasized at all of the companies oﬀering them.
The ﬁnancial predictability of DC plans was another factor suggested
among employers choosing them. An executive at company no. 11, for ex-
ample, argued that the certain cost associated with DC plans enabled more
accurate cost monitoring, and thus better business decisions. At company
no. 17, it was suggested that the company had very little physical or ﬁnan-
cial capital, and thus could not aﬀordt oassume any large ﬁnancial risks.
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans have an implicit risk to the company, since the com-
pany is obligated to pay a deﬁned pension amount regardless of the invest-
ment performance of the pension fund.
While it is impossible to generalize about the characteristics of compa-
nies choosing one approach or the other in this small sample, the choice
ofaD Bo rD Ca pproach seems to be associated with a broader choice of
employee relations strategy. Some companies motivate workers through
direct productivity incentives, carefully monitoring employee perfor-
mance, and rewarding high productivity. These companies tend to like DC
plans with no future promises. Other companies motivate workers indi-
rectly through expressions of paternalistic support. These companies tend
to like DB plans and postretirement medical plans that are designed to
insure the long-term well-being of long-service employees. Executives at
two companies referred directly to these diﬀerences in strategy.
Some industries, like the chemical industry, are very gentlemanly. Other
industries, like the high-tech industry, are dog-eat-dog. (Interview at
company no. 2)
Diﬀerent companies use diﬀerent strategies in their relationship to
employees. IBM uses a soft approach, trying to elicit good worker mo-
rale by never ﬁring workers. [Company no. 11] uses a performance-
oriented approach in which unproﬁtable divisions are rapidly changed.
(Interview at company no. 11)
At the companies choosing DC plans, productivity monitoring on the
employee and business-unit levels was suggested as a critical ongoing as-
pect of employment. At company no. 1, it was only the commissioned
employees who participated in the DC plan, and their entire compensation
wasb ased on productivity. At companies no. 3, 11, and 17, annual wage
adjustments were based on careful and detailed worker performance anal-
yses; workers receiving poor evaluations were routinely terminated. At
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redesigned or closed. Companies following this aggressive, performance-
oriented strategy considered their retirement beneﬁts as components of
current compensation for worker productivity. The immediate distribution
and certain cost of DC plans make them more consistent with a perfor-
mance-oriented approach.
While this study includes too few companies to draw any systematic
conclusions about the determinants of policy variability across companies,
the interviews suggest that many policy decisions are not carefully con-
ceived, and are, to a signiﬁcant extent, arbitrary. Based on the few compa-
nies participating in this study, the idiosyncratic preferences of chief exec-
utive oﬃcers (CEOs) seems to dominate any observable company
characteristics. Although no CEOs were interviewed for this study, discus-
sion with other executives suggests the overwhelming inﬂuence of CEOs
at many companies, and the apparent arbitrariness of many of the deci-
sions made.
We boil up ideas, but the Chairman comes through with the tablet....
Top management just likes deﬁned beneﬁt plans. They think deﬁned
beneﬁt plans are what retirement policy should be. They have a percep-
tion that this is what [company no. 6] owes its retirees. (Interview at
company no. 6)
Most companies don’t have any great philosophy. Senior management
just likes a deﬁned beneﬁt plan. They think it’s “right.” (Interview at
company no. 8)
[The CEO] started this company and we hear a lot of stories about
whenthe company was small: how people gave up a lot, and how we owe
them for it. He believes that we should take care of retired employees.
(Interview at company no. 18)
I don’t know about other companies, but this CEO is involved in ev-
erything....W e’ll take a proposal to him. He’ll ask us 500 diﬀerent
questionsa bout it, and then he’ll tell us what he wants. We have no idea
what he will decide until wep r esent a proposal. (Interview at company
no. 20)
Thet op managers are older and that has a big inﬂuence. They weigh
retirement more heavily than a typical worker, and that aﬀects their
policy decisions. (Interview at company no. 2)
In summary, companies that appear quite similar can have very diﬀerent
retirement policies, and these diﬀerences in policy may not be explained
by diﬀerences in observed company characteristics. Moreover, because of
the many competing factors inﬂuencing retirement policy decisions, execu-
tives making these decisions can ﬁnd a reasonable justiﬁcation for just
abouta ny policy selected. In the end, it appears that the idiosyncratic
judgments of individual executives guide at least part of retirement pol-
icy design.
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One of the companies in the sample conducted a particularly compre-
hensive evaluation of its pension plans over the period of this study. What
is interesting about this case study is the company’s explicit objective to
design a pension plan that is “neutral relative to the age at which retire-
ment occurs,” and the company’s subsequent development of a policy pro-
posal that contains retirement incentives anyway.
Thep olicye v aluation was implemented because of a concern among
company executives that the value of the beneﬁts from the DB plan and
the supplementary savings plans were lower than the values of comparable
beneﬁts oﬀered by competing employers. To address these competitive de-
ﬁciencies, a special committee was appointed to evaluate the then-current
policies and to develop a new policy proposal. Two philosophies domi-
nated the evaluation process. First, the company wanted a retirement pol-
icy that adequately supported the retirement income needs of retirees. Sec-
ond, the company wanted a retirement policy that was competitive with
those oﬀered by competing employers. A great deal of the committee’s
time was spent evaluating the relative importance of these two philoso-
phies.
Initially, the primary motivation of the committee was to develop a new
policy that would adequately support the needs of retired employees. Ac-
cording to executives at the company, the importance of these company
values dated back to the founding of the company, and to the founder’s
belief that employees should be treated as family. As in past policy evalua-
tions, the company established a series of income replacement targets, cali-
brated to enable “full career” employees to maintain their preretirement
standards of living. The company then compared the replacement rates of
the current plans with the target replacement rates. This retirement needs
analysis was conducted in some detail, with calculations made for employ-
ees with diﬀerent salary levels, diﬀerent service histories, and diﬀerent
retirement ages. The primary conclusion of this analysis was that the com-
pany’s existing policies fell signiﬁcantly short of their income replace-
ment targets.
As the evaluation process progressed, the company’s interest in design-
ing a policy to satisfy retiree needs lost some of its importance, because
members of the committee noted the diversity of the company’s labor force
and the wide variation in retirement needs across employees—and, thus,
the inability of the company to choose one right retirement policy (or in-
come replacement rate) for every employee.
Thec ompany cannot determine the retirement cash needs of employees
since each individual’s situation is diﬀerent. This has been caused by
changed workforce demographics, such as the prevalence of dual wage-
earner families. Therefore, the company should not base the design of
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“average” employee. (Presentation slide)
In its place, the company adopted a retirement policy strategy based
more heavily on competitiveness in the labor market, and on ﬂexibility to
meet a diversity of employee needs:
Thec ompany recognizes employees’ responsibility to set their own re-
tirement objectives. The company will help employees achieve their ob-
jectives by providing automatic and elective retirement beneﬁts as well
as education. The value of beneﬁts received by employees and the re-
sulting cost to the company will be driven mainly by competitive posi-
tioning and the extent to which employees utilize elective beneﬁts. (Pre-
sentation slide)
Thus, competitive positioning became the most important criterion mo-
tivating the policy design, and a group of thirty competing employers was
selected for comparison. The existing retirement policy was carefully
ranked relative to those of the competing companies. The primary conclu-
sion of this competitive analysis was that the company’s current retirement
policies ranked very low relative to the policies oﬀered by competing em-
ployers.
While competitive positioning became the most important policy objec-
tive, the committee developed a number of other criteria on which their
retirement plans should be evaluated. The ﬁnal set of objectives included
competitiveness objectives, ﬁnancial objectives, employee education ob-
jectives, workforce planning objectives, and employee relations objectives.
These are summarized in table 10.2, using language adopted by the com-
mittee for a presentation to senior management. Note that under its
“Workforce Planning Objectives” the company explicitly referred to a pol-
icy that is “neutral relative to the age at which retirement occurs.”
These objectives were formally approved by senior management, and
the committee was then directed to develop a retirement policy proposal
based on these objectives. The committee proposal included a new DB
pension plan, and the addition of employer matching provisions to the
supplementary savings plan. Figure 10.3 shows the compensation values
of the proposed pension plan, by age.
The new plan clearly was not age neutral. According to an executive
who worked extensively on the plan evaluation, “there were competing
objectives and other objectives were weighed more heavily.” In the end, by
far the most important factor motivating the policy proposal at this com-
pany was a desire to be competitive in the labor market—it had been the
competitive deﬁciency in the existing policy that inspired a policy evalua-
tion in the ﬁrst place. Then, to address this competitive deﬁciency, a policy
wasd esigned with a similar structure and a similar value to the policies
oﬀered by competing companies. Despite the decision to move away from
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review committee emphasized retiree welfare as a long-standing priority
of their CEO and as the second-most important motivation in the ﬁnal
plan design. The presence or absence of retirement incentives was a third
tier of concern in the evaluation process, and was eventually outweighed
by other policy priorities.
Table 10.2 Retirement Policy Objectives
Competitiveness Objectives: Thea ggregate position of the company’s retirement programs should be
average; the company should value longer service more than higher age; retirement beneﬁts
should be independent of hierarchy . . .
Financial Objectives for the Company: Retirement beneﬁts programs must be aﬀordablet ot h e
company; provide the company with a predictable ﬁnancial cost; and provide retirement beneﬁts
in the most cost-eﬀective manner.
Financial Objectives for Employees: Provide employees with a predictable ﬁnancial beneﬁt to help
them plan savings for their retirement; provide retirement beneﬁts in the most cost-eﬀective
manner to employees; provide retirement beneﬁts with an acceptable level of investment and
inﬂation risk.
Employee Eduction Objectives: Thec ompany has a responsibility to ensure that employees
understand that they are responsible for planning for their retirement; to provide opportunities
fore m ployee education so that they are able to plan for their retirement; to provide a
comprehensive set of tools to enable employees to plan for their retirement.
Workforce Planning Objectives: Plan design should be neutral relative to the age at which
retirement occurs, but should be ﬂexible to react to business and changing workforce
requirements. Plan design must support recruitment and retention of employees with desired
skill mix; plan design must support the recruitment of skilled senior employees.
Employee Relations Objectives: Employees believe that the company’s retirement programs are
valuable, competitive, equitable. Employees believe that the company helps them prepare for
retirement.
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Fig. 10.3 Compensation value of new pension plan, employees hired at ages
twenty, thirty-ﬁve, and ﬁfty10.10 Retirement Policy in Transition
Many of the companies participating in this study evaluated or changed
one orm o r ea s p e cts of their retirement policies around the time of the
study. First, two companies replaced their DB plans with DC plans, and
severalo thers increased their contributions to supplementary retirement
saving plans. Second, several companies with DB plans raised the ages
of early and normal retirement, and implemented larger decreases in the
beneﬁts of those choosing early retirement. Third, several companies elim-
inated, decreased the value of, or at least questioned the provision of post-
retirement medical beneﬁts. Table 10.3 lists the policy changes or proposed
changes by these companies.
Together, these changes are suggestive of a trend toward policies with
fewere a rly retirement incentives. This results partly from the increasing
use of DC plans and other retirement saving plans, relative to that of tradi-
tional DB pension plans; partly from increases in the age of eligibility for
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Table 10.3 Changes in Retirement Policies
Changes in Deﬁned Contribution Plans
Company no. 2 Raised company matching rate from 25 to 50 percent.
Company no. 3 Terminated deﬁned beneﬁt plan and implemented deﬁned
contribution plan.
Company no. 11 Terminated deﬁned beneﬁt plan and implemented deﬁned
contribution plan.
Company no. 12 Raised matching rate from 67 to 75 percent for management.
Raised matching rate from 50 to 60 percent for
nonmanagement.
Company no. 18 Considered implementation of 25 percent company match.
Changes in Deﬁned Beneﬁt Plans
Company no. 1 Raised minimum age for full pension from 60 to 62.
Reduction factor increased from 3 to 5 percent per year.
Company no. 3 Terminated deﬁned beneﬁt plan and implemented deﬁned
contribution plan.
Company no. 11 Terminated deﬁned beneﬁt plan and implemented deﬁned
contribution plan.
Company no. 12 Raised minimum age for full pension from 55 to 60.
Company no. 18 Considered reduction factor of about 6 percent, instead of
graded (3.33 percent and 6.67 percent); and raising normal
retirement age from sixty-ﬁve to sixty-seven (with Social
Security), and early retirement age from ﬁfty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-
seven.
Changes in Post-Retirement Medical Plans
Company no. 1 Raised employee share of premium.
Company no. 4 Raised employee share of premium.
Company no. 14 Eliminated plan.
Company no. 20 Raised employee share of premium.early and normal beneﬁts within the traditional plans; and partly from the
decreasing prevalence of postretirement medical beneﬁts.
Thec onsistent explanation for increasing provision of DC and supple-
mentary saving plans was related to their popularity among employees and
to the need to remain competitive with other employers who were oﬀering
these beneﬁts. An additional explanation for terminating the DB plan at
company no. 3 was to gain access to the surplus assets in the pension fund.
Other managers of DB plans referred to the growing legal and administra-
tive costs of DB plans in complying with new regulations, and their de-
creasing desirability for that reason.
At the companies that changed the provisions of their DB plans, induc-
ing employees to defer retirement until older ages has been an important
motivation.T here was a particular concern at some companies that fewer
younger workers would be available in the future to ﬁll the positions cur-
rently held by older workers. Though applicable to only a few companies,
these comments were the most direct evidence of retirement incentives’
having a signiﬁcant role in policy reform.
Thec onsistent explanations for reductions in postretirement medical
beneﬁts was their increasing cost, based on increasing health care costs
generally, and the increasing ratio of retirees to employees at most com-
panies.
Overall, the change in the age demographics of the U.S. population
seems particularly important in inspiring current trends. At one time, pa-
ternalistic retirement policies were inexpensive. Companies could support
retirees without a large expenditure of resources because there were many
more working employees than retired employees, and because retired em-
ployees had shorter life expectancies. Indeed, the employee-relations ad-
vantages of being a “caring” company almost certainly exceeded the cost
of paternalistic programs. The increasing older population, and the in-
creasing cost of retirement programs, have inspired a growing number of
companies to reevaluate their traditional paternalistic values.
An umber of companies referred to these changing priorities and, at the
same time, to the signiﬁcant impediments to policy reform. This suggests
that the current trend away from DB plans and postretirement medical
plans is likely to continue into the future, though the pace of change may
continue to be gradual.
Theo ld plan was a remnant of a diﬀerent era in retirement planning.
When the deﬁned beneﬁt plan was implemented, there was no such
thing as a 401(k) plan, and deﬁned beneﬁt plans were considered state
of the art. In addition, deﬁned beneﬁt plans were satisfactory to employ-
ees at that time, because very few other companies oﬀered deﬁned con-
tribution plans. (Interview at company no. 3)
Al ot of companies are locked-in to their existing plans. If they could
start again, they would choose deﬁned contribution plans, but they al-
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hourly employees are very suspicious of changes, particularly the “can-
cellation” or “termination” of a pension plan. Second, deﬁned beneﬁt
plans are one of the main selling points used by unions to attract union
membership. Unions claim that their protection of deﬁned beneﬁt plans
assures that workers will have a decent retirement income. (Interview at
company no. 11)
Do you want to convince employees that they are better oﬀ without
the type of pension plans they are used to, and without the type of plan
that is oﬀered by the competitors? Do you want to renegotiate the new
retirement plan with thirty unions? Do you want to pay the legal and
administrative costs associated with terminating the existing plan, and
setting up the new plan? Do you want to ﬁgure out how to comply with
all of the government regulations associated with terminations? . . . As
long as no one is complaining about the current plan, it just isn’t worth
trying to change it. (Interview at company no. 9)
10.11 Summary and Discussion
At fourteen of the twenty companies in this study, all employees partici-
pated in a retirement policy with incentives to retire at particular ages. At
another three of the companies, some categories of employees participated
in a retirement policy with incentives to retire at particular ages. Only
three companies had retirement policies that did not encourage the retire-
ment of older workers. Despite the widespread use of policies that encour-
ager etirement, the main ﬁnding of this study is that retirement incentives
are typically not a central motivation for the policy design.
Two motivationsh aved o minated the past design of business retirement
policies—concern about retiree welfare, and concern about competitive-
ness in the labor market. A great deal of the current structure of business
retirement policies is based on a history of paternalistic company values.
Many executives indicated that their companies had the responsibility to
insure the well-being of retired employees and, because of this responsibil-
ity, many executives viewed their retirement policies more as entitlements
or welfare for retired employees than as compensation for working employ-
ees.T his view of retirement policies is reﬂected in pension plans and post-
retirement medical plans designed to support the needs of retired em-
ployees.
The eﬀecto fthese company values on the economic structure of retire-
ment policies is to encourage retirement. The beneﬁts of those retiring
early cannot be reduced too dramatically, or early retirees will be unable
to maintain their preretirement standards of living. Similarly, the beneﬁts
of those retiring late need not be increased, since their preretirement stan-
dards of living can be maintained with normal beneﬁt levels. Thus the
retirement policies have an economic structure that encourages retirement,
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design.
Business concerns about competitiveness in the labor market have had
the eﬀecto fspreading these traditional policies more widely through the
business community. In order to be competitive, companies have chosen
policies with similar structures and similar values to those oﬀered by com-
peting employers. Thus companies without strong paternalistic values have
been driven by competitive pressures to implement policies with the same
economic structures. Whether the policies at a company were motivated
more byac oncern for retiree welfare or more by a concern for competitive-
ness in the labor market, the same policies with the same economic struc-
tures and the same retirement incentivesh ave been chosen. In either case,
it was not the retirement incentives that motivated the policy design.
A study by Siegel (1990) reaches many of the same conclusions made in
this study. Siegel’s study focuses on the retirement policy decisions that
have been made by companies that terminated their DB pension plans in
order to remove excess assets from overfunded pension accounts. This was
ap articularly interesting sample, because these companies were in the po-
sition to design and implement new policies with any economic structure.
According to Siegel’s study, approximately 20 percent of companies ter-
minating their DB plans in 1987 and 1988 replaced the terminated plans
with DC plans. This is consistent with the idea of a gradual transition in
plan design. Most of the other companies apparently implemented plans
identical to those that had been terminated. For both the companies re-
storing DB plans and the companies replacing their terminated plans with
DC plans, Siegel ﬁnds that retirement incentives (or their absence) were
notamotivating factor in the company’s decision. According to Siegel:
Not a single person mentioned retirement incentives in any aspect of
the discussion. All of the ﬁrms in this sample cancelled their plans be-
cause they wanted to recoup excess assets. Almost all ﬁrms that chose
deﬁned beneﬁt plans replaced with mirror plans. Reasons that they gave
for their decision included appeasing alarmed workers, providing for
long-term employees suﬃciently, inertia, and their ability to save money
with riskier investments. Treasurers who chose deﬁned contribution did
so because employees appreciate more knowledge and control over their
assets, cash ﬂow management is easier, and administrative costs are les-
sened. Again, not a single interviewee mentioned incentives for retire-
ment as an inﬂuence on their decision.
Siegel’s conclusions are much the same as those reported in this study.
Even though most large companies have retirement policies that encour-
age retirement among older workers, these retirement incentives were not
ap r imary motivation for the policy design.
Given the loss in productive activity caused by retirement in the United
States, it is potentially worrisome that businesses do not consider the
332 Richard Woodburyeﬀects of their policies on retirement behavior more carefully. At the same
time, however, there are increasing indications that companies that are
dissatisﬁed with the retirement behavior of their workers are looking to-
ward their retirement policies as potential instruments for changing that
behavior.
The idea that pensions are deliberately designed to encourage retirement
is not supported by this study. However, as the population continues to
age, and as retirement policies consume an even larger percentage of cor-
porate payrolls, businesses are likely to focus much more attention on the
retirement behavior of their workers and, consequently, on the relation-
ships between retirement policies and retirement behavior. Indeed, this
same study conducted in 2020, when the baby-boom generation is retiring
in record numbers, is likely to reach some very diﬀerent conclusions about
the key motivations for retirement policy decisions of the future.
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